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Abstract: Big history surveys the past on all scales up to those of cosmology. It 
answers questions explored in traditional creation stories and universal his-
tories, but it does so with the methods and the evidence of modern scientific 
scholarship. Though still marginal within historical scholarship, big history is 
attracting increasing interest and holds out the promise of a fruitful unifica-
tion of different disciplines that study the past at many different scales. This 
paper discusses the emergence of big history and its current status and role 
within historical scholarship.
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Introduction
“Big History” explores the past at very large temporal and spatial scales. It takes 
familiar arguments for the importance of the longue durée and pushes them to 
their limits by surveying the past as a whole. Fernand Braudel, like most historians 
interested in the longue durée, argued that history is best studied at multiple scales 
because each scale can add new dimensions to our understanding of the past. As 
Braudel put it:
“[…] the way to study history is to view it as a long duration, as what I have 
called the longue durée. It is not the only way, but it is one which by itself can 
pose all the great problems of social structures, past and present. It is the only 
language binding history to the present, creating one indivisible whole.”1 
David Christian, Department of History, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia. 
David.Christian@mq.edu.au 
92 ÖZG 20.2009.2
The same intuition drives much contemporary scholarship in world or global his-
tory. Big history simply takes these intuitions to their extreme. But that is quite 
a radical step, for it means moving well beyond the conventional borders of the 
history discipline. Big history assumes that historians can find interesting objects, 
phenomena and questions at all scales, even at scales more familiar to geologists or 
cosmologists than to historians. 
The impulse to explore the past at all possible scales is surely as old as human 
culture. In all societies we know of, there seem to have been attempts to understand 
the past as a whole. Such projects were undertaken with the utmost seriousness and 
according to the highest available standards of truth and rigour because they pro-
vided fundamental frames of reference for all members of society. Modern attempts 
to construct complete maps of the past have been influenced increasingly by the 
methods and insights of modern science. But not until the middle of the twentieth 
century did it really become possible to study the whole of the past with scientific 
rigour. Crucial to this transformation in modern understanding of the past was the 
elaboration of new dating methods that made it possible to assign reliable absolute 
dates to events before the existence of written documents. So, though big history 
asks ancient questions, it could become a serious branch of modern scientific schol-
arship only from the middle of the twentieth century.
The current status of big history remains unclear. Though it has begun to 
attract considerable interest, particularly from world or global historians, as well as 
from scholars in other disciplines, including geology and astronomy, the number 
of scholars seriously committed to the field at the end of the first decade of the 
twenty-first century can probably be listed on the fingers of two hands. Finding 
a well-defined niche for big history within modern educational institutions will 
not be easy, because the field is by its very nature inter-disciplinary; it can find 
nourish ment as easily in cosmology or palaeontology as within the traditional his-
tory discipline. For this reason, if big history ever does become a recognized field of 
scholarship it will surely have a profound impact on both scholarship and teaching, 
because it will link many different historically-oriented disciplines that are currently 
quite isolated from each other.
This paper will discuss what big history is and what it tries to do. It will also 
survey the current state of what remains an embryonic field of scholarship. And it 
will take up some of the questions historians are bound to ask about such a project: 
Are there valuable insights for historians at the scales of geology or cosmology? Are 
they significant enough to justify the intellectual, organizational and even political 
difficulties of crossing so many discipline boundaries? Can serious research really 
be conducted at such large scales and across so many disciplines? In short, has “big 
history” anything to offer professional historians?
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The Historiographical Background
In modern Universities and research institutes, with their fractal organization of 
knowledge into many different disciplines and sub-disciplines, the idea of big his-
tory is bound to seem odd. Certainly it must appear over-ambitious because it 
embraces more scholarly disciplines than any one individual can possibly master. So 
it is important to remember that the ambition of trying to understand the past as 
a whole is not new; it is in fact extremely ancient. In most cultural traditions, it has 
been taken for granted that historical understanding should at least try to embrace 
all of the past. “Universal history” of some kind appears in the historical thinking 
of all societies we know of. In non-literate societies it takes the form of what we 
patronisingly call “creation myths”: attempts to use the best available knowledge 
to place society within a larger, often cosmological, context. Creation myths were 
foundational to most cultures because they provided each individual with a basic 
sense of orientation in time and place. In some form, universal history has also 
flourished in all major cultural traditions. It can be found in the Muslim world (in 
the work of Tabari, Rashid al-Din and Ibn Khaldun), or in the encyclopaedic tradi-
tion of Chinese official historiography, or in the chronicles of Mesoamerica.2 For 
the Mediterranean world, from which modern historiographical traditions would 
later emerge, Raoul Mortley has traced the emergence of a self-conscious tradition 
of universal history soon after the conquests of Alexander the Great.3 This tradition 
re-emerged in the universalistic traditions of Christian historiography, which would 
shape western historical thought for almost 1500 years. As Collingwood puts it: 
“The conception of history as in principle the history of the world […] 
became a commonplace. The symbol of this universalism is the adoption of a 
single universal chronological framework for all historical events. The single 
universal chronology, invented by Isidore of Seville in the seventh century 
and popularized by the Venerable Bede in the eighth, dating everything for-
ward and backward from the birth of Christ, still shows where the idea came 
from.”4 
Bishop Bossuet’s Discourse on Universal History, published in 1681, represents, in 
the view of Bruce Mazlish, the “last gasp” of a Christian tradition of universal his-
tory which dated from the time of St. Augustine.5 But more secular forms of univer-
sal history would flourish for another two centuries during the Enlightenment and 
in the hands of the great nineteenth century system builders from Hegel to Marx 
and Spenser. As Fred Spier has noted, Alexander von Humboldt began, but did not 
finish, a series of volumes on “a cosmical history of the universe.” In the introduc-
tion to the first volume, published in 1845, he summarized his aims: 
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“Beginning with the depths of the space and the regions of remotest nebulae, 
we will gradually descend through the starry zone to which our solar system 
belongs, to our own terrestrial spheroid, circled by air and ocean, there to 
direct our attention to its form, temperature, and magnetic tension, and to 
consider the fullness of organic life unfolding itself upon its surface beneath 
the vivifying influence of light.”6 
The language captures well the aspirations of all universal histories.
Then, sometime in the late 19th century, universal history vanished as a serious 
scholarly pursuit. As the prestige of the natural sciences rose, history, like many 
other fields of scholarship, began to set higher and more “scientific” standards of 
rigour, accuracy and evidence. This meant concentrating on the written sources that 
provided the most reliable evidentiary foundation for dating and understanding 
the past. An inevitable consequence of the increasing use of written sources was a 
drastic narrowing of the scope of historical scholarship. Fields such as prehistory or 
popular history, or the history of the natural world, for which little documentary 
evidence was available and even fewer dates, were cut ruthlessly from the discipline. 
Such brutal amputations made sense as attempts to guarantee the scientific rigour 
of historical scholarship. As Leopold von Ranke put it in the introduction to the 
universal history that he began at the end of his life: 
“History cannot discuss the origin of society, for the art of writing, which 
is the basis of historical knowledge, is a comparatively late invention. […] 
The province of History is limited by the means at her command, and the 
historian would be over-bold who should venture to unveil the mystery of the 
primeval world, the relation of mankind to God and nature.”7 
In 1898, in one of the more widely used texts published at the end of the nineteenth 
century, Langlois and Seignobos wrote: “[t]he historian works with documents. 
[…] For want of documents the history of immense periods in the past of humanity 
is destined to remain for ever unknown. For there is no substitute for documents: 
no documents, no history.”8
The history profession paid a significant price for these gains in scholarly rigour. 
Above all, historians had to give up any hope of understanding history as a whole. 
Universal history was cut from the discipline along with prehistory. Historians 
settled instead for the more modest ambition of documenting some of the past, and 
history, like many other fields of scholarship, began to resemble a vast archipelago 
of knowledge islands between most of which there was little or no commerce. Ranke 
understood as well as anyone what had been lost:
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“The study of particulars, even of a single detail, has its value, if it is done 
well. […] But this specialized study, too, will always be related to a larger 
context; even local history will be related to the history of the whole country, 
a biography to the history of a major event in church and state, to an epoch 
of national or universal history. But all of these epochs themselves, as we have 
noted, belong in turn to the entire whole which we call universal history. The 
study of these epochs in a wider context is of a correspondingly greater value. 
The final goal – not yet attained – always remains the conception and com-
position of a history of mankind.”9 
Eventually, like an amputee whose phantom pains slowly subside, most historians 
began to forget about universal history, and concentrated their energies on the 
more practical and rewarding challenge of studying those parts of the past for 
which there existed rich archival sources. As Robert Novick has argued, particularly 
in the English speaking world these shifts encouraged a general suspicion of large 
hypotheses and a return to the more modest task of clarifying “the facts”.10 Histo-
rians abandoned universal history all the more willingly given the evident dangers 
of constructing grand narratives where there was little hard evidence. Ranke’s 
own unfortunate attempt at universal history showed the dangers: it ended up as 
a story about Aryans. Meanwhile, the idea of the nation state provided the history 
discipline with a serviceable alternative to real coherence. If history could no longer 
study the past as a whole, it could at least recount the whole history of particular 
nations. And of course, national governments willingly supported this view of the 
role and function of history, and equally willingly ignored the fact that the grand 
narratives of national history could be quite as toxic as those of universal history. 
All in all, there were many good reasons for abandoning big picture history. 
H.G. Wells’ universal history, An Outline of History, was written in the immediate 
aftermath of the First World War and in the hope of creating a common history of 
humanity. 11 But despite its commercial success, it had a limited impact on historical 
scholarship. And one reason was surely the largely speculative nature of the early 
parts of the book. Trevor-Roper’s cruel quip that Arnold Toynbee’s Study of History 
ranked “second only to whiskey” as a dollar-earner captures the scorn professional 
historians came to feel for any attempt at universal history.12 Memories of a larger, 
more unified understanding of the past never vanished entirely, but they were 
banished to the profession’s untamed frontier regions. Toynbee himself remained 
confident that fashions would change, but when he was interviewed by Ved Mehta 
in the early 1960s his hopes must have seemed utopian: 
“[Toynbee] comforted himself with the thought that the days of the micro-
scope historians were probably numbered. They, whether they admitted it 
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or not, had sacrificed all generalizations for patchwork, relative knowledge, 
and they thought of human experience as incomprehensible chaos. But in 
the perspective of historiography, they were in the minority, and Toynbee, 
in company with St. Augustine – he felt most akin to him – Polybius, Roger 
Bacon, and Ibn Khaldun, was in the majority.”13
Origins of Big History
Early in the twenty-first century, hyper-specialization still rules historical schol-
arship, and the fear that grand narratives are bound to be both poisonous and 
unscientific reinforces resistance to big picture scholarship. Yet the recent rise of 
more expansive views of the past suggests that Toynbee may have been right after 
all. Since the 1980s, accelerating globalization and the emergence of environmental 
issues affecting the entire world have revived interest in processes of global change 
and long-term historical processes.
The same currents have undoubtedly driven interest in big history. But equally 
important have been other changes that historians largely ignored. These changes 
have made it possible for the first time to study the remote past with the same 
degree of rigour expected in conventional historical scholarship. 
Perhaps the most important of these changes concern chronology.14 Though 
historians often take chronology for granted, it is fundamental to any serious 
historical scholarship. After all, if events cannot be precisely ordered in time, rigor-
ous discussion of causation is impossible. “Dates and a coherent dating scheme,” 
noted M. I. Finley, “are as essential to history as exact measurement is to physics.”15 
Before the middle of the twentieth century, absolute dates could be assigned to 
past events only where reliable written documents existed. Dates could be assigned 
with reasonable plausibility to Chinese ruling dynasties for some three thousand 
years, while Egyptian political dates were reasonably trustworthy for almost four 
thousand years. But beyond these dates chronology simply collapsed. Nineteenth 
century archaeologists and geologists learned to assign relative dates to events in 
the remote past, but not until the middle of the twentieth century was it possible 
to construct reliable absolute timelines reaching back further than the 4,000 or so 
years of recorded history.
The “chronometric revolution” of the mid twentieth century began with the 
development of radiocarbon dating techniques by Willard Libby in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s. The basic principle of radiocarbon principle had been understood 
since the discovery of radioactivity early in the century. It was that radioactive 
materials, such as the isotope of carbon known as Carbon 14, break down at a pre-
dictable pace, so that, by measuring the extent of radioactive breakdown it should 
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be possible to determine when a lump of material was first formed. Libby was the 
first to develop sufficiently precise and practicable techniques for making these 
delicate measurements. Since then, numerous other radiometric techniques have 
been developed, using different radioactive materials with different “half-lives”, so 
that different techniques can be used to measure different time scales. Carbon 14, 
for example, with a half-life of about 5,730 years, can be used to determine dates 
up to about 50,000 years ago, while other elements, such as Uranium, with much 
longer half-lives, can be used to date events many billions of years ago. Indeed, the 
power of radiometric dating was demonstrated spectacularly in 1953 when Clair 
Patterson of the California Institute of Technology, used material in meteorites to 
determine for the first time that the earth was formed about 4.5 billion years ago. 
Many non-radiometric dating techniques have also been developed and these dif-
ferent techniques can be used to check each other. For example dendrochronology, 
or the counting of tree rings, was used to re-calibrate Carbon 14 dates once it was 
realized that levels of C 14 in the atmosphere have varied sufficiently over time to 
significantly affect the accuracy of carbon dating techniques. 
As a general rule, historians have not adequately appreciated the significance of 
these developments for our understanding of the past. The simplest way of putting 
it is to say that just 60 years ago reliable timelines could extend only three or four 
thousand years back in time, which severely limited the scope of historical research. 
Now, we can construct reliable and increasingly detailed timelines reaching back 
13 billion years, to the very origins of the Universe. The chronometric revolution 
means that history at the largest possible scales can now meet the standards of chro-
nometric rigour taken for granted in traditional historical scholarship.
A second, related change, is the increasing historicisation of the natural sci-
ences.16 In the nineteenth century, geology and biology both became historical dis-
ciplines. That is to say, scholars in both fields learned that the present state of affairs 
was the product not just of general laws, but also of many slow changes over vast 
periods of time. But this general awareness of geology and biology as historical dis-
ciplines could not transform research until radiometric dating techniques made it 
possible to construct reliable absolute timelines within both these disciplines. More 
recently, astronomy and cosmology have also become historical disciplines as it has 
been realized, partially since the 1920s, but more generally since the discovery of the 
cosmic background radiation in 1964, that the Universe as a whole is also a product 
of historical changes over large periods of time. Here, too, new dating techniques 
have made it possible to construct reliable and increasingly precise timelines for the 
past of the Universe as a whole.
Taken together, these changes mean that we can now tackle many of the ques-
tions asked within traditional universal histories with something of the precision 
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and rigour of modern science. Human history based on written records can now be 
integrated within a much larger account of the past that includes human prehistory 
as well as the entire history of the natural world. It is true, of course, that only writ-
ten records can give us a rich insight into the internal world of historical actors.17 
But it is also true that big history, by placing traditional historical scholarship within 
a much larger context, raises the historical question of how, why and when human 
conscious arose, and what is the precise relationship between a world of conscious 
actors and a world of natural processes. In other words, big history encourages a 
re-examination of the relationship between history and the natural sciences.
In summary, big history in its modern forms represents more than a naive nos-
talgia for the grand visions of universal history. It is, rather, a product of the rapid 
and accelerating development of historical and scientific scholarship in the twen-
tieth century. The questions of universal history were abandoned not because they 
were bad questions, but because they could not be tackled with adequate rigour. A 
century later, much has changed and many of those questions now can be tackled 
according to the highest scholarly standards. This is the challenge taken up by big 
history.
Big History Today
Currently, big history exists as an interesting but still marginal sub-discipline on the 
borders between history, biology, geology and astronomy. There are several courses 
in big history being taught at universities in Australia, the USA, the Netherlands 
and Russia. The astronomer, Eric Chaisson, has taught an astronomer’s version of 
big history in Boston since the 1970s; and currently, the geologist Walter Alvarez is 
teaching a geologist’s version of big history at Berkeley. The first historians to teach 
such courses were John Mears, at Southern Methodist University in Dallas, Texas, 
and David Christian, at Macquarie University, in Sydney. Both courses began at the 
end of the 1980s.
Though I have argued that there are objective reasons for renewed interest in 
big-picture history, my own path towards big history was extremely serendipitous. 
It was driven largely by a naïve curiosity about the outer limits of the history disci-
pline. I began my career as a historian of Russia. In the 1970s and 1980s, under the 
influence of the Annales school, and the major British Marxist historians, I studied 
the material life of the nineteenth century Russian peasantry. Braudel argued per-
suasively that study of the slowly changing patterns of material life requires the 
historian to think on large scales and to look for large patterns that are invisible 
from close up. This is because such subjects are shaped more powerfully by large 
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and slow-moving structural features of the past than by the more rapidly chang-
ing, and less predictable events of traditional political history described within the 
Annales tradition as l’histoire événementielle. At the scale of political events, unpre-
dictable quantum processes seem to dominate history, as they dominate physics at 
the scale of sub-atomic particles. General laws can explain little at this scale, and the 
researcher must be alert to the contingent, the unpredictable and the unexpected. 
Yet at the scales of demographic history or the study of material life, which aggre-
gate large amounts of detailed information, larger patterns become more apparent, 
as they do in the physics of large numbers of quantum processes.
The conviction that large historical patterns, more or less invisible at the scales 
of traditional historical scholarship, might become apparent at very large scales, 
may have pushed me in the direction of big history. But my first step in this direc-
tion was itself a quantum process. In a departmental discussion about what should 
be taught in our foundation courses (a discussion so familiar to the many tribes of 
University historians that it can be counted as one of their distinctive anthropo-
logical rites), I remember suggesting, entirely facetiously, that we should teach “the 
whole of history”. This, I argued, would equip students with a sort of world map 
of the past which would help them place specific historical subjects within a larger 
global context. My colleagues ignored my comment, and they were right to do so. 
However, my suggestion nagged away at my mind and over the next few weeks I 
began to wonder if it might really be possible to teach a history course covering 
“the whole of history”. The first question that worried me was: when did history 
begin? None of my colleagues could offer serious answers to what struck me as an 
important question, and yet I began to feel that it was embarrassing for a profes-
sional historian not to be able to identify the outer limits of the history discipline. 
Pursuing the question of beginnings on my own, I realized it might make sense 
to start with the appearance of our own species, Homo sapiens. But that answer 
already threatened to take me beyond the conventional borders of the discipline, 
into prehistory, palaeontology and biology. In any case, the question of human 
origins seemed lure me into an infinite regress, as different aspects of humanity led 
me further and further back in time, to the origins of bipedalism, of mammals, of 
intelligence, and even of life itself. Eventually, though, I discovered to my surprise 
that if I pursued these questions far enough (How did life originate? How did the 
earth originate? How did the Universe begin?) there was an end to the regress. This 
is because, at present we have no idea how to say anything scientific and we have no 
empirical evidence about anything that happened before a tiny fraction of a second 
after the big bang. Here, in practice, was an objective starting point for a complete 
history of the past. 
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Was it possible to teach a viable history course that began with the big bang? It 
was immediately obvious that such a course would consist, like a matrioshka doll, 
of many different stories nested one within the other, and told at different scales. 
This was good. It meant that the course would raise interesting historical questions 
about the relationship between different scales and the different phenomena that 
dominated each scale. What can understanding of the big bang tell us about our 
earth and solar system? What links stars and living organisms? What is the dif-
ference between complex chemicals and living organisms? What distinguishes the 
history of our own species from the histories of many other species? What, in other 
words, makes human history different from, say, the history of chimps, or elephants 
or dolphins or owls? I soon decided that, if nothing else, such questions would pro-
voke interesting discussion about the nature, scope and purpose of history, and my 
colleagues, with some anxiety (and some averting of the gaze), allowed me to road 
test such a course for first year students.
I began teaching big history in 1989. To give the lectures, I recruited colleagues 
from astronomy, geology, biology, anthropology, ancient history and history to 
lecture in the course. For the readings, I cobbled together a collection of readings 
that included works by scientists and anthropologists (including Marshall Sahlins’ 
famous essay, The Original Affluent Society, and the theoretical introduction to Eric 
Wolf ’s Europe and the Peoples without History). The first lecture discussed time. The 
second lecture discussed creation stories, in order to raise the possibility that this 
course could be thought of as a modern, scientifically based, creation story. Then we 
began at the beginning with lectures on the key ideas of big bang cosmology and the 
evidence on which it is based. Created in the big bang, 13.7 billion years ago, were 
the fundamental constituents of our Universe: matter and energy and (perhaps) 
time and space as well. There followed lectures on the formation of stars and galax-
ies. These are some of the largest inhabitants of our Universe, and stars generate 
the energy flows that drive change on planets such as our own earth. Discussion 
of the life cycle of stars led naturally to discussion of the creation, within stars and 
supernovae, of most of the chemical elements of the periodic table. Equipped with a 
much richer palette of chemical elements, it was now possible to discuss the creation 
of planets and of living organisms. Lectures described the creation, in orbit around 
stars, of planets, and of our own solar system, about 4.5 billion years ago. Lectures 
on the early earth and the evolution of the earth’s atmosphere and its surface (a 
topic that introduced plate tectonics), led naturally to the subject of life itself which, 
intriguingly, appeared very early in the history of our planet. What is life? How does 
natural selection work? And how did life arise on earth? There followed lectures on 
the major stages in the evolution of life over almost 4 billion years, ending with an 
account of the evolution of our bipedal ancestors, the hominines (from about 6 
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million years ago), and of our own species, Homo sapiens, sometime within the last 
200,000 years. The appearance of our own species was associated with the emergence 
of new, accelerated mechanisms of change, as the social accumulation of information 
began to transform lifeways faster than the slower mechanisms of genetic change. 
With human history, culture overtook natural selection as the main driver of his-
torical change. The rest of the course surveyed the consequences of this momentous 
transition. Lectures covered the Palaeolithic era of human history (embracing well 
over 90% of the time humans have been on earth), the Agrarian era of the last 10,000 
years, and finally the Modern era, covering just the last few centuries. Under pressure 
from students, shocked that a course dealing with such large patterns and trends 
might refuse to consider the near future, we soon began giving lectures on prospects 
for the near future and even for the future of the Universe as a whole.
Our first attempts at teaching big history showed several things. To no one’s 
surprise, they showed that teaching such a course was difficult. We encountered 
awkward border crossings as we moved from discipline to discipline. At these 
borders the language changed, as well as the paradigms, the central questions and 
the notions of what counted (or did not count) as legal scholarly behaviour. Over 
time, we managed to ease the border crossings for ourselves and for our students 
by learning how to translate the jargon of one discipline into the jargon of another. 
Often, this showed that different disciplines were asking similar questions but in 
different scholarly dialects. The biologist talking of “evolution” or the astronomer 
talking of “star formation” or the geologist discussing erosion were all referring 
in different ways to what historians might describe simply as historical change or 
change through time. Is change fundamentally the same thing in cosmology, bio-
logy and history? Whatever the answer, discussing the question was interesting for 
both teachers and students.
On the other hand, we found it was remarkably easy to construct a coherent 
story of origins. Each new topic seemed to arise naturally from the previous topic, 
rather as if the Universe was slowly being filled up with the entities and forces 
needed to explain the world around us. The big bang provided the energy and raw 
materials for the manufacture of stars, while stars provided the energy and raw 
materials for the manufacture of planets. Similarly, the chemical and thermody-
namic complexity of planets made possible the even more complex chemistry of 
living organisms, and understanding of the evolution of the biosphere set the stage 
naturally for the appearance of our strange species. Finding coherence in this grand 
story turned out to be surprisingly easy.
Student responses to the course demonstrated that there is a huge thirst for 
large, coherent and all-embracing accounts of the past. The best students found 
even the prototype versions of the course extremely satisfying because they raised 
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large questions that are normally avoided in University courses, and they held out 
the possibility that there might be interesting answers to them somewhere. How 
significant are human beings in the history of the planet? Or even the Universe? Is 
human history a continuation of the history of life on earth? Does it make sense 
to treat human history in complete isolation from the history of the biosphere? Or 
does the appearance of human beings count as a new turning point in the history 
of the planet? The course also raised powerful questions about the near future. Are 
humans doing serious damage to the biosphere? Are present consumption levels 
sustainable? Are levels of inequality greater than ever before in human history? Are 
there solutions available to such problems? All in all, we found that the agenda of 
big history was exciting for students because of the large, interlinked questions that 
it raised, whether or not it could promise fully satisfactory answers.
What of scholarship in big history? Fred Spier has shown that a number of works 
published since the middle of the twentieth century can legitimately be regarded as 
studies in big history, beginning with Erich Jaensch’s The Self-Organizing Universe.18 
In 1992, I published an article describing my big history course, and it was in that 
article that I first used the label, “big history”.19 I used it because I needed a simple 
and memorable label to describe the course. It is not ideal, of course, but it seems to 
have stuck. And the article itself attracted significant attention, particularly among 
world historians in the USA. In 1996, Fred Spier published the first book-length 
study of big history: The Structure of Big History.20 In it, Spier, argued that the 
notion of distinct “regimes” might offer a conceptual framework for thinking about 
big history. In 2001, Eric Chaisson published an astronomer’s view of big history 
in Cosmic Evolution, which he followed up five years later with another survey of 
big history, The Epic of Evolution.21 In 2004, I published Maps of Time, an attempt 
to summarise the story of big history, as I understood it, within a single volume.22 
In 2007, Cynthia Stokes Brown published a second text in big history.23 In 2009, 
Fred Spier will publish a major study on big history exploring the central theme of 
increasing complexity.24
Research Agendas
There is, as I have argued, a clear narrative coherence to the agenda of big history. 
But can it yield a deeper coherence? Can big history yield new scientific research 
agendas? I believe that, by raising questions across multiple disciplines and com-
bining the insights and methods of different disciplines, it can indeed yield new 
research agendas. E.O. Wilson has argued forcefully that we are on the verge of a 
grand unification of scholarly disciplines that will prove even more significant than 
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the earlier unification of physics and astronomy whose majestic offspring was big 
bang cosmology.25
Eric Chaisson has shown how the coherent narrative of big history might yield 
deep research agendas in his discussions of complexity in big history. He has shown 
that there are powerful reasons for thinking that, over 13.7 billion years, the upper 
level of complexity has slowly increased. And with each new level of complexity, we 
can identify new emergent properties that define the central problems of different 
scholarly disciplines. At an intuitive level this claim is surely correct. For the first 
hundred or two hundred million years of its existence, the Universe was simple. It 
consisted of huge clouds of dark matter (whose nature remains obscure, though we 
do know that it has few interactions with forms of energy apart from gravity); huge 
clouds of visible matter, consisting (after about 380,000 years from the big bang) 
almost entirely of hydrogen and helium atoms; and four different types of energy. 
The Universe as a whole was relatively homogenous and most of its properties could 
be explained within the fundamental laws of physics. With the appearance of the 
earliest stars and galaxies, large, structured objects, organized mainly by the force of 
gravity, emerged, and the Universe became less homogenous. Of particular impor-
tance for us are differences in density and temperature. Stars, whose hot centres 
fused hydrogen into helium atoms, represented tiny furnaces in a Universe most of 
which was close to absolute zero. These energy differentials could drive processes 
that would eventually generate new levels of complexity in the vicinity of stars. 
Stars (particularly large stars) also raised the general level of chemical complexity 
by manufacturing elements up to iron in their cores, and then by manufacturing 
all other stable elements in the vast explosions of dying large stars known as super-
novae. A world of extreme chemical simplicity slowly turned into one in which, in 
the heart of galaxies there appeared new substances, with entirely new properties. 
At this point, the laws of chemistry come into play. Only in a Universe seeded with 
all the elements of the periodic table could planets form. In deep space, but more 
actively on the surface of planets orbiting stars, complex new substances began to be 
manufactured by the chemical combination of atoms in environments seeded with 
many new elements and powered by the energy differentials generated by nearby 
stars. Some planets were ideally placed to nurture chemical reactions of exceptional 
complexity, being neither too close to the energy flows generated by their parent 
stars, nor too far away. On at least one planet in one star system, there emerged 
large chemicals so intricately organized that we think of them as living organisms. 
Life represents a new level of chemical complexity, as living organisms can replicate 
themselves and slowly change and adapt to their environments according to the 
laws of natural selection. This is the source of their astonishing diversity, and their 
emergent properties are studied within the life sciences.
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Seen within this large framework, human history itself can be seen as the prod-
uct of a new level of complexity. What distinguishes change in human history from 
change in the biological realm is that humans can exchange learned information 
with such speed and precision that learned knowledge begins to accumulate within 
each human community. As learned knowledge accumulates within each commu-
nity, humans begin to adapt no longer just through the slow mechanisms of genetic 
change, but the much faster mechanisms of cultural change. As a result, the diver-
sity of human societies is greater by orders of magnitudes than that of any other 
living species. Only within our own species can learned information accumulate 
so effectively that it begins to drive change faster than natural selection. In other 
words, with the appearance of our own species we discover new emergent proper-
ties driven by a new mechanism of change, which we can call by the more familiar 
label of cultural change. 
I hope this discussion suggests how the large framework of big history can sug-
gest new ways of understanding what is distinctive about human history. It also 
suggests that the dangers faced by our biosphere today arise not simply because 
of developments in recent centuries, but from the very nature of our species as 
an information exchanging organism that can accumulate ecologically significant 
information in ways that no other species can match. All living species can adapt to 
their environment; that is one of the defining features of life itself. We are simply 
terrifyingly, even dangerously, good at adapting. We are, in fact, “hyperadaptive”.
I hope this brief, and highly simplified survey of how one might think about 
complexity within the agenda of big history can also suggest how big history can 
link the many knowledge islands of today’s vast archipelago of knowledge by tracing 
a single, coherent, story of change in time across many different disciplines.
The Future of Big History?
When I began teaching it twenty years ago, the idea of big history seemed little 
more than an intriguing intellectual experiment, even though I soon realized that 
I was not the only scholar conducting such an experiment. At the end of the first 
decade of the twenty-first century, big history is still marginal. But it is no longer 
invisible. There have been several trans-disciplinary conferences on the subject, two 
in Russia and one organized by the Santa Fe Institute in Hawaii, in 2008. Big his-
tory is now being taught in a number of history departments, and in departments 
of astronomy and geology in several countries. But the indirect influence of big 
history is greater than these figures might suggest, for its questions and agendas are 
beginning to influence some of the agendas of world history.26 My own impression 
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is that, in general, the natural sciences offer a more friendly environment for big his-
tory than the humanities disciplines. This may be because the natural sciences have 
already witnessed several powerful intellectual revolutions generated by the coming 
together of once isolated disciplines. One of the most spectacular recent examples 
is the emergence of big bang cosmology from the coming together of nuclear phys-
ics and astronomy. Indeed, so powerful was that merger that scientists often talk 
of “grand unifying theories” with an abandon that would shock most historians. 
Equally spectacular, and much more influential in practice, has been the emergence 
of modern genetics from the borderlines of biology and biochemistry. The humani-
ties have generally been less optimistic about the value or even the possibility of 
such large inter-disciplinary mergers, and there remains significant resistance to 
grand narratives such as those implicit in big history.
However, it is my hope that this resistance will eventually vanish, and that the 
basic story of big history will become a familiar piece of intellectual furniture in the 
minds of all historians and perhaps of all scientists, a “grand unified story” to match 
the “grand unified theories” of modern physics. Indeed, if creation stories are as sig-
nificant as their apparently universal presence in human societies suggests they are, 
then big history ought to be part of every high school syllabus. Its presence in high 
school curricula would ensure that all high school students would acquire a sense 
of the fundamental unity of modern knowledge, and the way that different forms 
of knowledge can combine to help explain the world and Universe we inhabit. In an 
intellectual environment where the basic story of big history was familiar to every 
educated citizen, we might also expect a sense of global citizenship to seem more 
natural, and we might also expect interdisciplinary research to seem more natural.
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